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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor

Admissions-United States v. General Pharinacal
Co., 205 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1962). During
prosecution for conspiracy to violate the Federal
Food, Drug, & Cosmetics Act [21 U.S.C. §§331 &
333 (1958)], defendant moved to suppress a
statement which he had made to Federal Food
and Drug Inspectors. Defendant contended that
since the inspectors had gained entry into his
plant by means of false representations, his statement was obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search and seizure and should therefore be suppressed. The District Court denied the motion,
holding that since defendant's statement was
voluntary and the evidence failed to establish that
the inspectors had falsely represented their intentions merely to make a routine inspection of
the premises, defendant's statement was admissible.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Royster, 204 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
Defendant moved to suppress counterfeit money
and for suppression of all statements he made to
state or federal officers while he was in jail prior
to arraignment, contending-that the money was
seized as the result of a search of his home without
a search or arrest warrant and that he was illegally
detained in jail before being taken before a committing magistrate. The District Court granted
defendant's motion, holding that where defendant,
who had not yet been arrested, was asked for
identification by Cleveland police officers in his
bedroom and, upon being unable to find an identification card in his wallet due to nervousness, gave
the wallet to a police officer who asked if he could
help, defendant did not consent to a search of a
dosed compartment of the wallet containing
counterfeit money; that even if the officers had
probable cause to arrest defendant without a
warrant before the wallet was searched, the search
could not be held lawful as incident to a valid
arrest, since defendant had not then in fact been
arrested; that the search could not be justified as
* Student, Northwestern University School of Law.

having been made because of "exceptional circumstances" due to impossibility of then obtaining a
warrant, since there was no threat of destruction
of the money and surveillance would have sufficed
to prevent defendant's flight until a warrant
became obtainable; and since defendant was arrested at midnight on September 10 and not
arraigned until 11 A.M. on September 13, his
admission should be suppressed because it was
made while he was being detained in violation of
FED. R. ClUM. P. 5(a), especially in light of the
fact that the Cleveland officers deliberately frustrated defendant's efforts to obtain counsel before
incarceration. (The opinion is not clear as to
whether federal officers took part in illegally detaining defendant or whether the detention was
effected solely by state officers, but a federal
secret service agent to whom defendant made an
admission was present during the detention.)
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Adans v. State,
143 So. 2d 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was convicted of violating lottery laws.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court erred in refusing to suppress evidence seized
illegally after his unlawful arrest. The District
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that where the
arresting officers entered defendant's premises
with his consent as private citizens rather than
under color of their office and observed him
violating the lottery laws, they lawfully arrested
him without a warrant; that the subsequent
reasonable search was lawful as incident to the
arrest; and the fact that when the officers entered
the premises they had in their possession a search
warrant which later was quashed by the trial court
as insufficient was immaterial, even though the
officers upon commencing to search purported to
execute the warrant, since the arrest and search
were lawful without resort or regard to the invalid
warrant.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Roelntk,
183 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. 1962). Having waived trial
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by jury, defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of narcotics by the trial court. On writ
of error, defendant contended that the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress as evidence
narcotics seized in violation of his constitutional
rights. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed,
holding that where defendant who was a previously convicted felon, and a known prostitute
who was also a known user of narcotics, were
walking along the sidewalk, they were not violating a Chicago ordinance making it unlawful for
persons of certain classes [e.g., felons, narcotics
addicts, prostitutes, etc.] to "assemble or congregate," since their actions did not constitute assembling or congregating; that since defendant
and his companion were not committing a criminal
offense in the presence of the arresting officers,
defendant's arrest without a warrant was unlawful; and consequently, although upon his arrest
defendant threw a packet containing the narcotics
sought to be suppressed into a parked car, thus
enabling the officers to recover it without resort
to a technical "search" since it was visible from
outside the car, the evidence should have been
suppressed, inasmuch as its discovery was a direct
and immediate result of defendant's unlawful
arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Commonwealth v.
Holmes, 183 N.E.2d 279 (Mass. 1962). Defendant
was convicted of assault and battery with a
deadly weapon. On appeal from the judgment,
defendant contended that the knife should not
have been admitted in evidence, since it was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed, holding that where police officers, having
information concerning a fight between defendant
and another, were admitted to defendant's home
by his wife and, while helping defendant to. dress,
discovered the knife in his pocket, the knife was
lawfully seized and properly admitted in evidence,
since seizure occurred incident to a lawful arrest
without a warrant, inasmuch as the officers could
reasonably have believed that defendant had committed a felony, and their conduct toward defendant in his home constituted an arrest.
Assault and Battery-People v. Young, 183
N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962). The Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction of third degree assault and
dismissed the information against him. On appeal
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by permission, the state contended that since
defendant aggressively intervened in the struggle
between non-uniformed police officers and the man
whom they lawfully were attempting to arrest,
defendant was properly convicted of assault in the
third degree. Noting that the question was oe of
first impression in New York, the Court of Appeals
reversed and reinstated the information, holding
that since the policy which prevails in the majority
of jurisdictions and which is most conducive to an
orderly society is that the right of a person to
defend another should not exceed that person's
right to defend himself, and since no crime was in
fact being committed upon the person being
arrested, defendant was properly convicted of
assault, inasmuch as he voluntarily and forcefully
pulled an officer away from the arrestee, defendant's reasonable belief that a crime was being
committed notwithstanding. Two dissenting judges
would have remanded for determination of the
reasonableness of defendant's belief that his intervention was necessary to prevent the arrestee from
being unlawfully beaten, since in their opinion such
reasonable belief should constitute a valid defense
to the crime charged.
Confessions-Jones v. United States, 307 F.2d
397 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. On appeal from the judgment,
defendant contended that she was entitled to a
new trial because the district court erred in admitting over her objection a confession obtained in
violation of FED. R. CmR. P. 5(a). The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that although the
police procured defendant's oral confession at 4:25
A.M. on Sunday without undue delay and then
placed her under arrest, the full written confession
signed by defendant at 8 A.M. Sunday was
erroneously admitted at the trial because of violation by the police of Rule 5(a), since after arresting defendant they continued to question her and
returned her to the scene of the crime to gather
evidence, failing to take her before a committing
magistrate until 9 A.M. Monday even though a
magistrate was available 24 hours a day on Sunday.
The court noted that the unreasonable delay was
that period between defendant's arrest and her
signing of the written confession, during which
time she was not but could have been taken before
a magistrate.
Confessions-People v. Weinstein, 184 N.E.2d
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312 (N.Y. 1962). Defendant was convicted of third
degree burglary and petit larceny, and the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court affirmed. On appeal by permission, defendant contended that he was convicted on the
basis of an illegally obtained confession. The Court
of Appeals of New York affirmed per curiam,
without opinion. Judge Fuld, in a dissenting
opinion in which Judge Van Voorhis concurred,
stated that the confession should not have been
admitted, since it was procured while defendant
was paroled in the custody of the police on a baseless charge of vagrancy which was used as a pretext
for detaining defendant in order that the police
could continue to interrogate him about the
burglaries.
Confessions-People v. Rodriguez, 183 N.E.2d
651 (N.Y. 1962). See Right to Counsel, infra.
Conspiracy-Eyman v. Deutsch, 373 P.2d 716
(Ariz. 1962). After being convicted of conspiracy
on his plea of guilty, petitioner applied for habeas
corpus to the Superior Court which granted the
writ and ordered his discharge from confinement.
On appeal from the order and judgment, the
superintendent of the state prison contended that
the prior acquittal of petitioner's co-defendant of
the conspiracy charge did not absolve petitioner
from a plea of guilty by operation of law. The
Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, holding that
although the trial court had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the offense and over the person
of petitioner, it lacked jurisdiction to render a
judgment of guilty under the circumstances, since
judgment was rendered after the acquittal of
petitioner's co-defendant, which operated as an
acquittal of petitioner even though he had previously pleaded guilty.
Double Jeopardy-Nolan v. Court of Gen. Sessions, 181 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1962). Charges of
attempted larceny against defendant police officers
were dismissed, but the jury was unable to agree
as to the attempted burglary count. When the
case was to be retried, the assistant district attorney and the defense tendered to the trial judge
a stipulation, providing that the retrial on the
remaining count be held before the judge without
a jury solely on the record of the earlier trial,
which stipulation was accepted by the judge,
whereupon the former trial record was offered in
evidence by the prosecution. Eight months later,

the judge on his own motion announced vacation
of this stipulation in the interest of justice and
directed that the case be retried; the case again
was reached on the trial calendar. Defendants then
commenced a prohibition proceeding, dismissal of
which by the Supreme Court, Special Term, was
reversed by the Appellate Division, which ordered
prohibition. On appeal by the state, defendants
contended that proceeding with the trial would
amount to double jeopardy in light of the trial
court's prior acceptance of the stipulation. The
Court of Appeals of New York affirmed, holding
that since after the transaction concerning acceptance of the stipulation all that remained was
argument by counsel followed by judgment, that
transaction amounted to a presentation of evidence
on a trial of the remaining count and thus constituted jeopardy; and consequently the judge's
subsequent vacation of the stipulation violated
defendants' rights against double jeopardy and
prohibition against further proceedings on the remaining count was properly ordered.
Electronic Eavesdropping-United States v.
Massialh, 307 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962). Defendants
were convicted of conspiracy to import drugs in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§173 & 174 (1958) and of
related substantive offenses. On appeal from the
judgments, defendants contended that the trial
court improperly admitted evidence of their incriminating conversations with a co-defendant, one
Colson, since these were obtained by means of a
transmitter installed in Colson's automobile by a
narcotics agent; and defendant Massiah, who was
under indictment and represented by counsel at
the time of his conversation, further contended
that the transmission violated his right not to be
approached by government agents in absence of
counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed as to the conspiracy counts for
insufficiency of instructions regarding guilty knowledge, but affirmed as to the substantive counts,
holding that use of the hidden device in codefendant Colson's car did not constitute unlawful
eavesdropping in violation of defendants' rights,
since the device was installed with Colson's consent;
and since Massiah voluntarily entered Colson's car
and had a conversation with him, the fact that he
was under indictment and had retained counsel
did not grant him immunity from the government's
procuring additional evidence in absence of counsel,
inasmuch as anything Massiah voluntarily said or
did which constituted an admission of the pending
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charges was admissible against him. The court
recognized that contacts such as that which the
narcotics agent made through Colson are. useful
and desirable, and noted recent congressional
concern over the need to give narcotics agents
every reasonable means of securing evidence.
Evidence of Other Crimes-People v. Crocker,
183 N.E.2d 161 (Ill. 1962). Defendant was convicted of the rape of Rebecca Foxx. On writ of
error, defendant contended that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in permitting the
state to prove his guilt of the separate offense of a
rape other than that for which he was being tried,
and in failing to grant a mistrial after the other
woman, Sarah Easley, testified that she was
pregnant by defendant as a result of the other
rape. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and
remanded, holding that although evidence of the
other rape was admissible as part of the res gestae,
since it occurred immediately after the rape with
which defendant was charged, it was reversible
error not to grant a mistrial after Sarah Easley
testified that she was pregnant by defendant, since
this evidence, which was irrelevant to the case,
was of so highly prejudicial a nature that its effect
on the jury could not have been cured when the
trial court sustained defendant's objection to the
testimony, particularly in light of the fact that the
jury assessed punishment as well as guilt. In
holding the evidence of the separate offense admissible, the court specifically overruled People
v. Gibson, 99 N.E. 599 (Ill. 1912).
Extradition-Thompsonv. Bannan, 298 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1962). Petitioner was convicted of armed
robbery in the Michigan courts. On appeal from
the District Court's denial of his application for
writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contended that
when the State of Michigan surrendered him to
Illinois for extradition while the Michigan robbery
charge was pending, Michigan forever relinquished
jurisdiction to subsequently try petitioner on that
charge. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed, holding that although surrender pursuant
to extradition of one already sentenced is held to
constitute implied pardon or commutation of that
sentence, petitioner was properly tried by Michigan
after his return from Illinois following acquittal of
murder in Illinois, since Michigan's temporary
surrender of petitioner to Illinois was not a waiver
of jurisdiction over him with regard to the pending
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robbery charge on which petitioner had not, at the
time of surrender, been convicted and sentenced.
Federal Communications Act-State v. Carbone,
183 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1962). See Wiretapping, infra.
Habitual Criminal Acts-People v. Perkins, 182
N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of first degree manslaughter and was sentenced as
a second felony offender. On appeal by permission
from the Appellate Division's affirmance of the
County Court's denial of his application for coram
nobis, defendant contended that his prior conviction of manslaughter in North Carolina was not
a valid predicate for his sentence as a second
felony offender in New York. The Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed, holding that although manslaughter was a common law rather
than a statutory crime in North Carolina, defendant's North Carolina manslaughter conviction
was properly used as the foundation for his
sentence as a second felony offender, since the act
which North Carolina case law has defined as manslaughter (the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice and without premeditation) would
be a felony in violation of N.Y. PEN. LAws §1049
if committed in New York. Judge Froessel, with
whom Judge Van Voorhis concurred, dissented on
the ground that defendant could have been convicted of manslaughter under North Carolina law
on the basis of an act which in New York would
have constituted justifiable homicide, inasmuch as
New York and North Carolina law differ as regards the defense of having killed in self-defense
or defense of another.
Improper Remarks by Prosecutor-State v.
Driver, 183 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1962). See Lie Detector Evidence, infra.
Jencks Act-Campbell v. United States, 296 F.2d
527 (1st Cir. 1961). After defendants were convicted of bank robbery, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the district court for determination of
whether defendants had improperly been denied
access to an FBI report, [Campbell v. United States,
365 U.S. 85 (1961), abstracted at 52 3. CRmm. L.,
C. & P.S. 295 (1961)], and the district court then
determined that there had been no improper
denial. On appeal from this ruling, defendants
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contended that the district court erred in failing
to summon one Staula, the prosecution witness
whose testimony defendants sought to impeach by
means of the FBI report, pursuant to the Supreme
Court's decision, since defendants had a right to
cross-examine Staula regarding his interview with
the FBI agent, inasmuch as his testimony was
relevant to the issue of whether the report constituted a "statement" within the Jencks Act [18
U.S.C. §3500 (1958)]. The Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit retained jurisdiction of the appeal
but returned the original papers to the district
court with direction to conduct a hearing with
Staula and the FBI agent present and to return
said papers including the further proceedings,
holding that although evidence established that
the report was not "substantially verbatim" within
sub-section (e)(2) of the Jencks Act, it might be
"a written statement made by said witness and
signed or otherwise approved by him" under subsection (e)(1), having been written by the FBI
agent during an interview with Staula; and since
Staula's testimony at the first trial was considered
by the district court on remand in his absence,
defendants were thereby deprived of their right to
cross-examine him as to whether he had "signed or
otherwise adopted or approved" the report.
Juries-State v. Brown, 126 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1962).
Defendant Negro college students were convicted
of breach of the peace for marching toward the
business district of the city of Orangeburg. On
appeal, defendants contended that the magistrate's
absolute refusal to conduct voir dire examination
of prospective jurors as to possible bias or prejudice
deprived defendants of their right to trial by an
impartial jury. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed and remanded, holding that the
right to examination of prospective jurors to determine whether prejudice existed was necessarily
included in the right to an impartial jury; and
consequently the magistrate's absolute refusal to
make such inquiry upon request required reversal.
Jurisdiction-Lintfey v. State, 374 P.2d 628
(Okla. Crim. App. 1962). Petitioner was convicted
of bigamy. On petition for writ of habeas corpus,
petitioner contended that since the offense was not
committed in the county wherein he was tried, the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to render judgment
and sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Oklahoma denied the writ, holding that when

petitioner with advice of counsel voluntarily
pleaded guilty to the information, he gave the
trial court jurisdiction of himself and of the subject
matter and jurisdiction to pronounce judgment and
sentence, even though the offense was committed
in a county otherwise outside the jurisdiction of
the court.
Kidnapping-Adams v. State, 126 S.E.2d 624
(Ga. 1962). The Court of Appeals of Georgia
certified to the state Supreme Court the question
whether a father could be convicted under GA.
CODE ANN. §26-1602 (1953) of kidnapping his own
minor child from the mother, where the mother
had temporary custody of the child during pendency of divorce proceedings. The Supreme Court
of Georgia answered in the negative, holding that
since the temporary decree awarding custody to
the mother, unlike a permanent custody decree,
was merely interlocutory and was not a final
adjudication of the parental rights of the mother
and father, it could not serve as a basis for convicting the father of kidnapping his own child from
the mother..
Lie Detector Evidence-State v. Driver, 183
A.2d 655 (N.J. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of first degred murder. On appeal, defendant contended that the prosecutor's references in his
opening statement to defendant's refusal to take
a lie detector test constituted prejudicial error.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed and
remanded, holdinj that since results of polygraph
examinations are inadmissible, defendant's refusal
to submit to one could not properly be the subject
of comment; aid inasmuch as the improper remarks probably led the jury to believe defendant
had a consciousness of guilt, his conviction must
be reversed even though no objection was made to
the remarks, particularly since the state's case was
substantially based on circumstantial evidence and
the probable aura of prejudice created by the
remarks thus may have greatly influenced the
verdict.
Narcotics-Peope v. Williams, 179 N.E.2d 639
(Ill. 1962). Defendant was convicted of unlawful
possession of narcotics. On writ of error, defendant
contended that the evidence failed to prove he
possessed narcotic drugs in violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drugs Act [ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§192.28 (1957)], since it was not established that

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES

methadon hydrochloride found in his possession
was a narcotic drug within the statutory definition
[§192.28-2.17], and since the quantity of morphine
sulphate found in his possession was within the
amount exempted by statute [§192.28-12]. The
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that
where the evidence showed that the substance
tested was not identical in chemical formula with
that defined, and no evidence established that the
substance found was a salt of methadon within the
statutory definition, the state failed to prove that
this substance was a narcotic drug under the
statute; that although the quantitative exception
by its terms applied only to the "prescribing, administering, dispensing, or selling at retail" of
medicinal preparations containing narcotic drugs
below a stated concentration, omission from the
exception of "possessing" must have been merely
inadvertant, since all who sell, etc., must first
necessarily possess, and therefore defendant could
avail himself of the exception; that in light of the
fundamental principle that the prosecution bears
the burden of establishing a criminal defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence sufficient
to raise a reasonable possibility that a defendant
comes within the exemption creates a reasonable
doubt of his guilt; and consequently evidence that
the morphine drug was a "medicinal preparation"
created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt,
and even though he failed to prove that the concentration of narcotics therein was less than that set
out in the exception, absence of proof offered by
the prosecution that it exceeded the statutory
concentration rendered the evidence insufficient to
sustain defendant's conviction.
Police Power-People v. Munziato, 182 N.E.2d
199 (fll. 1962). The Criminal Court of Cook
County quashed an indictment charging defendant
with operating an overweight vehicle on the TriState Tollway. On writ of error, the state contended that the indictment charged a crime under
§131 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways UILL. R v. STAT. ch. 95 , §228 (1959)],
and that the Uniform Act was constitutional as a
valid exercise of the state's police power. The
Supreme Court of Illinois reversed and remanded,
holding that the delegation by the legislature of
power to regulate traffic on tollways to a commission did not cause tollways to be excepted from
the general application of the Uniform Act, since
the section which delegated this power [ILL. REv.
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STAT. ch. 121, §314a33 (1959)] indicated that the

commission's power was exercisable only with regard to matters not provided for in certain statutes,
including the Uniform Act; that operation of §131
of the Uniform Act, which fixed weight limitations,
did not deprive defendant of due process of law,
since the power to regulate the weight of vehicles
on highways was within the state's police power,
and the record failed to show that the limitations
prescribed were unreasonable; that since §132 of
the Uniform Act [§229], which provided that a
"police officer having reason to believe that the
weight of a vehicle and load is unlawful shall
require the driver to stop and submit to a weighing
of same," authorized only such investigation as
was necessary to effectuate §131, it was therefore
reasonable and consistent with federal and state
constitutional provisions regarding unlawful
searches and seizures; and since what defendant
was required to do [i.e., submit to a weighing]
constituted compelled conduct rather than testimonial compulsion, his privilege against selfincrimination was not violated.
Right to Counsel-People v. Rodriguez, 183
N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1962). Defendants were convicted of murder. On appeal from the judgments,
defendants contended that the confession of defendant Carde, which fully implicated defendant
Rodriguez as well, was obtained in violation of
Carde's right to assistance of counsel and his
privilege against self-incrimination and consequently should not have been received in evidence.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed and
ordered a new trial as to each defendant, holding
that where Carde confessed in the absence of
counsel during police interrogation after arraignment but before indictment, his right to counsel
and privilege against self-incrimination were violated, since upon arraignment, which constituted
the dommencementof criminal proceedings, Carde's
right to counsel and right not to be interrogated
without the presence of counsel accrued, and
therefore his conviction, based on the tainted
confession, must be reversed; and since Carde's
erroneously admitted confession fully implicated
Rodriguez, the latter's conviction must also be
reversed in the interest of justice. In an additional
statement from which Judge Froessel dissented,
the court noted that if, upon a special hearing in
advance of retrial, certain incriminating statements
of Rodriguez should be found to have been induced
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by confrontation with certain articles, the statements must not be admitted in evidence under the
rule of the Mapp case, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), abstracted at 52 J. Cpnt. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
if the articles should be found to have been obtained by illegal search and seizure, since the
statements would thus be the inadmissible product
of an unlawful search.
Right to Counsel-People v. Meyer, 182 N.E.2d
103 (N.Y. 1962). The Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York reversed defendant's
conviction of first degree robbery, second degree
assault, and petit larceny, and ordered a new trial.
The state appealed, contending that defendant's
voluntary, unsolicited statement to a police officer
after arrest and arraignment but before indictment
was properly admitted at the trial. The Court of
Appeals of New York affirmed, holding that since
arraignment marks the first stage of a criminal
proceeding, defendant at that point was entitled
to counsel; and consequently, his post-arraignment
statement, made in the absence of counsel, was
inadmissible, even though the statement was
voluntary and unsolicited, and even though upon
arraignment defendant was informed of his rights,
including right to counsel, since defendant did not
waive this right nor was he estopped from asserting
it for failure to request counsel upon being informed
of his rights. Three judges dissented.
Search and Seizure-United Staes v. Boyette,
299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir.), cert. dnied, 82 Sup. Ct. 875
(1962). Defendants were convicted of procuring
the interstate transportation of a woman for
purposes of prostitution. On appeal, defendants
contended that the district court erroneously
received in evidence records of the earnings of
prostitutes working in the establishment to which
the woman was transported, since the records had
been seized in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that since the search was
made pursuant to a valid arrest of defendants with
a warrant, it was lawful, inasmuch as the search
was reasonably extended beyond "the restaurant
portion of the premises where arrest occurred to
that portion where prostitution was practiced and
where the records were found; and since the
records were instrumentalities of the crime of
operating a brothel, they were not purely evidentiary and thus were subject to seizure during

the reasonable search even though they were not
instrumentalities of the specific crime of which
defendants were convicted, inasmuch as the interstate transportation of a woman was a part of the
general criminal enterprise of operating a brothel.
Judge Sobeloff dissented, stating that since the
material seized was not an instrumentality of the
specific crime for which defendants were tried, it
was, in fact purely evidentiary as regards that
crime and therefore should not have been seized
or admitted.
Search and Seizure-Geniviva v. Bingler, 206 F.
Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961). Plaintiffs moved to
suppress as evidence in any criminal proceeding
money which had been recovered by police officers
after having been taken from their residence by
burglars, contending that such use would violate
plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.
[Although no criminal proceedings had been instituted against plaintiffs, the property in question
apparently tended to incriminate them under the
Internal Revenue Code.] The District Court
denied the motion, holding that since the money
had been obtained as a result of a burglary committed by persons not acting in concert with either
state or federal officials, no constitutional rights of
plaintiffs were thereby invaded by or under color
of official authority, and consequently plaintiffs
could not complain of any evidentiary use of the
property.
Search and Seizure-United States v. General
PharmacalCo., 205 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.J. 1962).
See Admissions, supra.
Search and Seizure-Bielicki v. Superior Coaurt,
21 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962). After their motions to
suppress evidence and to set aside the information
were denied by respondent court, -petitioners
sought a writ of prohibition restraining the court
from trying them on an information charging
them with the infamous crime against nature.
Petitioners contended that all the evidence to be
offered against them had been obtained by means
of an illegal search and seizure. The Supreme
Court of California issued the writ, holding that
where a police officer, who on many occasions
indiscriminately watched the activities of various
occupants of two pay toilet booths in an amusement park by means of a pipe installed through the
roof of the restroom building, in this manner
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observed petitioners committing the crime against
nature through a partition between the booths,
the officer's actions, which led to petitioners'
arrest, amounted to an unlawful general exploratory search conducted solely to discover evidence
of guilt; and that the search was unreasonable
even though the pipe had been installed and the
surveillance effected at the request of an agent of
the owners of the amusement park, since there
was o evidence that the officer had reasonable
cause to believe that the agent had authority to
consent to the spying. The court concluded,
"Authority of police officers to spy on occupants of
toilet booths-whether in an amusement park or a
private home-will not be sustained on the theory
that if they watch enough people long enough
some malum prohibitum acts will eventually be
discovered."
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burglary. On appeal, defendant contended that
testimony concerning a ring and the ring itself,
which constituted the only evidence establishing
his guilt, should not have been admitted, since the
ring was unlawfully obtained during an unwarranted search of defendant's home consented
to by his wife, and that defendant's confession
should not have been admitted, since it resulted
from the illegal search and was made while he was
in custody without having been promptly taken
before a magistrate. Noting that the case was one
of first impression in Hawaii as regards the consent
to search point, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
reversed and remanded, holding that although a
wife in joint control of premises has implied
authority of her husband to consent to entry by
police officers and to their search of certain aspects
of the premises, defendant's wife's authority did
not extend so far as to allow her to waive his
constitutional rights by permitting police officers
to search defendant'p personal effects [the ring was
discovered in a cuff link case in his bureau drawer];
that defendant's confession was not inadmissible
solely because it was made during a period of
delay between arrest and arraignment, where the
question of voluntariness was properly left to. the
jury; and although defendant had a right to have
excluded that portion of his confession in which he
identified the illegally, seized ring, the question of
whether the entire confession was tainted by the
unlawful search and therefore inadmissible could
not be determined from the record and must be
adjudicated on remand of the cause.

Search and Seizure-Britt v. Superior Court, 24
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962). Petitioner sought prohibition to restrain respondent court from trying
him on an information charging him writh violating
CAL. PEN. CODE §288a, contending that all the
evidence offered against him at the preliminary
examination and on which the information was
based was obtained by an illegal search and
seizure. On the authority of Bielicki v. Superior
Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1962), abstracted supra,
the Supreme Court of California issued the writ,
holding that where a police officer by means of a
pre-existing vent observed petitioner committing
the unlawful act in a department store's public
washroom while the officer was stationed at the
Search and Seizure-People v. Parren, 182
vent for the purpose of observing all users of the
washroom, his observation of petitioner was the N.E.2d 662 (Ill. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of illegal possession of narcotics. On writ of error,
result of an unlawful, general exploratory search;
that Bielicki controlled even though the obser- defendant contended that his constitutional rights
vation in the instant case was made through a vent were violated by the trial court's denial of his
rather than a spy-pipe, since the vent was used fqr motion to suppress illegally seized evidence. The
a purpose other than that for which it had been Supreme Court of Illinois reversed, holding that
installed, and even though use of the toilet stalls where the arresting officer, after receiving a 'tip
in Britt was free, because consent to such obser- from an anonymous informer that a man of a
vation could not be implied from lack of payment
certain description was selling narcotics at a
of a fee to occupy the toilet; and that although specified location, proceeded to that place and,
upon seeing defendant, who answered the depetitioner's act theoretically could have been
visible to any member of the public ,who entered scription and was carrying a piece of tinfoil and
the men's room, it was in fact discovered by means three brown envelopes, followed defendant from
the corridor in which he saw him into his apartof the impermissible search.
ament, arrested him without a warrant, seized the
Search and Seizure-State v. Evans, '372 P.2d tinfoil and envelopes which proved to contain
365 (Hawaii 1962). Defendant was convicted of heroin, and found marijuana during a subsequent
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search of his apartment, the arrest and search were
illegal for lack of probable cause, since the entry,
arrest and search were based solely on information
from an unknown source; and consequently defendant's motion to suppress was erroneously overruled.
Search and Seizure-People v. Munziato, 182
N.E.2d 199 (IM. 1962). See Police Power, supra.
Search and Seizure-Petition of Dirring, 183
N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1962). Petitioner was convicted
of possession of burglarious implements and unlawful carrying of firearms in 1958, and in July
1961 he petitioned for writ of habeas corpus. On
appeal from the Superior Court's denial of his
petition, petitioner contended that Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), abstracted at 52 J. CRIW. L.,
C. & P.S. 292 (1961), required that he be released,
since his convictions had been based on evidence
obtained in violation of his constitutional right to
be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed, holding that since the question of legality
of the search was not properly before the court due
to petitioner's failure to move to suppress the
evidence complained of before or during the trial,
denial of his petition for habeas corpus must be
affirmed without regard to thfe question of whether
Mapp should be given retrospective effect.
Search and Seizure-Commonwealth v. Spofford,
180 N.E.2d 673 (Mass. 1962). Defendant was convicted of possessing obscene pictures, and the
Superior Court affirmed. On appeal from the
judgment, defendant contended that all the obscene material used as vidence against him had
been obtained as a result of unreasonable search
and seizure. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts reversed, holding that Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), abstracted at 52 J.
Cnm. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961), would be given
limited retroactive effect so as to apply on appeal
to cases tried before its decision, and thus would
be applied by the Supreme Judicial, Court to
defendant's appeal, even though his appeal was
filed prior to Mapp; and that where defendant
consented to a search of his apartment during
police interrogation following an admittedly unlawful search which produced some obscene material, the evidence obtained by means of the
latter search must also be excluded since it re-

sulted from and was thus tainted by the original
unlawful search.
Search and Seizure-People v. Winterheld, 115
N.W.2d 30 (Mich. 1962). Defendants were convicted of breaking and entering in the nighttime,
and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, 102
N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 1960). In view of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), abstracted at 52 3.
Cs.m. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961), the court granted
defendants' motion for rehearing. On rehearing,
defendants contended that evidence obtained in
another state by officers of that state through a
search and seizure unlawful under the law of that
state and of Michigan should not have been admitted. The Supreme Court of Michigan reversed
the convictions and the trial court's order denying
defendants' motion to suppress, set aside the
sentences, and remanded, holding that the Mapp
decision required that the evidence complained of
should not have been admitted. [Though not explicit in the extremely short opinion, the reasoning
of the court appears to be as follows: since defendants' federal constitutional rights were violated by seizure of the evidence, they could not be
convicted by means of that evidence, even though
the seizing officers were from a state other than
the convicting state. This is consistent with construction of the "exclusionary rule" as a federal
constitutional guaranty rather than an evidentiary
rule designed to discipline the police.)
Search and Seizure-People v. Rodriguez, 183
N.E.2d 651 (N.Y. 1962). See Right to Counsel,
supra.
Search and Seizure-People v. Friola, 182
N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 1962). Defendant was convicted
of violating N.Y. PEN. LAws §§986 & 986-b, and
the Appellate Part of the New York Court of
Special Sessions affirmed.-On appeal by permission,
defendant contended that the evidence upon which
he was convicted was obtained by unlawful search
and seizure. The Court of Appeals of New York
affirmed, holding that iince defendant expressly
assented to admission of the evidence and the
record thus failed to show any evidence as to the
lawfulness of the search, the question of its alleged
illegality could not be reached on appeal for failure
of defendant to preserve a question of law for
review, even though the decision of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), abstracted at 52 3. Cra. L.,
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C. & P.S. 292 (1961), intervened between his trail
and the Appellate Part's affirmance. Two judges
dissented on the ground that New York appellate
courts will apply Mapp to a pre-Mapp case on
review only if the defendant had done what was
then "futile, unreasonable and contrary to the
then law...."
Self-Defense-Retreat--Cole v. State, 144 So.
2d 54 (Ala. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder. On appeal, defendant contended that the state was improperly allowed to
prove that a way of retreat was open to him, since
defendant was not required to retreat from his
place of business in order to avail himself of the
doctrine of self-defense. The Court of Appeals of
Alabama reversed, and remanded, holding that
although retreat would be required from a place
of business used primarily for illegal purposes, the
fact that defendant did not retreat from premises
he occasionally used for the unlawful sale of liquor
did not preclude him from asserting the doctrine
of self-defense.
Self-Incrimination-Hutcheson v. United States,
82 Sup. Ct. 1005 (1962). Petitioner was convicted
of contempt for refusing to answer pertinent
questions put to him by the Senate's McClellan
Committee, and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that questioning him
on matters germane to Indiana state criminal
charges then pending against him was offensive to
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Announcing the Court's judgment of affirmance
in an opinion in which Justices Clark and Stewart
joined, Mr. Justice Harlan stated that having
expressly waived his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to avoid use of his claim
of the federal privilege against him in the state
trial, petitioner could not rely on the self-incrimination aspect of due process; and that the State's
possible use of petitioner's claim of the federal
privilege neither excused him from asserting it
nor furnished independent support for his Fifth
Amendment due process challenge, since principles
of ripeness and justiciability dictated that the
exercise of a legitimate congressional power could
not be thwarted on the basis of conjecture. Mr.
Justice Harlan indicated that a different result
might be reached on review of a possible state
conviction if petitioner had asserted the Fifth
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Amendment privilege and the State had used it
against him. Chief Justice Warren dissented in an
opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas joined,
stating that placing petitioner in such a
dilemma-if he answered truthfully his answers
would aid the pending state prosecution; if he
answered falsely he could be prosecuted for perjury; if he relied on the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self'incrimination that fact could be used
against him at the state trial; and if he failed to
answer without relying on the privilege he could
be punished for contempt-constituted a denial
of Fifth Amendment due process by the Committee. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that so long as admissions or
claims of privilege made by a witness in a federal
proceeding can be used against him in a state
criminal proceeding, convictions such as petitioner's should be reversed because of fundamental
unfairness in violation of due process, and advocated that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination be held applicable to the states
and the federal government alike in order to avoid
petitioner's dilemma. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the result, and Justices Black, Frankfurter, and White took no part in the decision.
Sentencing-Defendant's Right to SpeakUnited States v. Allegrucci, 299 F.2d 811 (3d Cir.
1962). Defendant was convicted of possession of
goods stolen in interstate commerce, -knowing
them to be stolen. On appeal, defendant contended
that he was denied the opportunity to speak before
being sentenced by the trial court. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that where
before sentencing defendant the trial court told
defense counsel to "go ahead" but did not specifically ask defendant if he had anything to say,
defendant was improperly denied the opportunity
to be heard before being sentenced.
Sentencing-Morgan v. State, 142 So. 2d 308
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Defendant was convicted of grand larceny. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court's failure to make
available to him a presentence investigation report
deprived him of his right to confrontation and
cross-examination because it amounted to allowing
the use of hearsay evidence against him. The
District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
reliance by the sentencing judge upon the presen-
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tence investigation report was discretionary, as
was the sentence imposed, provided it was within
the statutorily prescribed range; that once convicted and about to be sentenced, defendant was
no longer in the role of one resisting and attempting
to controvert a charge against him; and for those
reasons and because factors considered and evaluated by a sentencing judge (i.e., environment,
personality, etc.) do not lend themselves to the
restrictions of trial practice and the rules of
evidence, defendant had no right of access to the
report and none of his rights were violated when
the trial judge refused to let him see it prior to
sentencing. The court noted that a piesentence
investigation report must be treated as a confidential compilation of information for the use of
the sentencing judge rather than as a public
document in order that frank and complete disclosures be confidentially made to permit the
judge to view as a whole the man about to be
sentenced.
Sentencing-People v. Gonzales, 184 N.E.2d 833
(IlM. 1962). Defendant was convicted of possession
and sale of marijuana. On writ of error, defendant
contended that the mandatory minimum punishment of ten years imprisonment for first offenders,
to which he was sentenced for sale of marijuana,
was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of
Illinois affirmed, holding that the statute [ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, §192.28-38 (1959)] was constitutional, inasmuch as the punishment could not be
said to be disproportionate to the nature of the
offense, in light of the seriousness of the traffic in
narcotics and in view of the fact that legislative
judgment with respect to criminal penalties would
not be interfered with unless the punishment was
so disproportionate to the offense committed as to
shock the moral sense of the community.
Sex Offenses--Carras v. District of Columbia,
183 A.2d 393 (D.C. Munic. App. 1962). After being
arrested for indecent exposure, defendant pleaded
guilty and was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital upon being adjudicated a sexual psychopath.
On appeal, defendant contended that he was not a
sexual psychopath within D.C. CODE §22-3503(1)
(1961), since the evidence showed that he would
not be likely to physically harm other persons.
The Municipal Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia affirmed, holding that defendant, who
had been convicted of indecent exposure on other

occasions, was a sexual psychopath as defined by
the statute, since by probable future acts of indecent exposure he was "likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil" on
others, inasmuch as the statutory language was
not restricted to physical injury but included
injury to feelings and mental suffering.
Speedy Trial-State v. Maldoizado, 373 P.2d 583
(Ariz. 1962). Defendant was convicted of first
degree burglary. On appeal, defendant contended
that a 79-day delay between arrest and preliminary
hearing violated his right to a speedy trial under
ARz. CoNsr. art. 2, §24 and deprived him of both
state and federal due process of law. The Supreme
Court of Arizona affirmed, holding that although
defendant was admittedly illegally detained, he
was not denied a speedy trial, since the right to a
speedy trial commences at the time of commitment
by a magistrate rather than upon arrest; and since
defendant's illegal detention did not result in any
unfairness or prejudice to him at the trial, he was
not deprived of due process by reason of the
detention. The court expressly stated its lack of
condonation of the abuse of authority in the
instant case and noted that the offending officers
were guilty of a misdemeanor.
Suppression of Evidence-Peoplev. Wilson, 182
N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1962). Defendants waived trial by
jury and were convicted by the trial court of
selling narcotics. On writ of error, defendants contended that they were deprived of their right to a
fair trial when federal agents sent a crucial witness
beyond the jurisdiction of the court and the trial
court denied defendants' motion to compel pro.
duction of the witness. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed and remanded, holding that where
a federal agent admitted that he gave the witness
money from official funds and put her on a train
to Texas in his official capacity, and where the
witness would presumably have given critical
testimony favorable to defendants concerning their
defense of entrapment, defendants were denied a
fair trial by the state, inasmuch as the state,
having secured all its evidence by means of federal
agents, could not divorce itself from their conduct.
Wiretapping-State v. Carbmoe, 183 A.2d 1 (N.J,
1962). Defendant was convicted of bookmaking
and conspiracy to make book. On appeal by certification, defendant contended that since evidence
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obtained in violation of §605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 [47 U.S.C. §605
(1958)] was admitted against him, his conviction
must be reversed. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed, holding that where during a raid
of defendant's premises a police officer answered
the telephone, indicated that he was a bookmaker,
and accepted a bet placed by the caller, he did not
"intercept" a communication within the meaning
of §605, since the officer was the immediate party
to the call even though the caller thought he was
speaking to a bookmaker, inasmuch as the caller
intended that his words reach the person who
answered, and as such the officer could not be said
to have intercepted a message en route to another.
(The court thus did not reach the issue of whether
evidence obtained in violation of §605 should be
held inadmissible in state criminal proceedings.)
Wiretapping-People v. Dinan, 183 N.E.2d 689
(N.Y. 1962). Defendants were convicted of gambling. On appeal by permission, defendants contended that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
abstracted at 52 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
rendered incriminating telephone conversations,
intercepted in violation of §605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934 [47, U.S.C. §605
(1958)] but pursuant to a state court order, inadmissible in their state prosecution. The Court
of Appeals of New York-affirmed, holding that
wiretapping is not unreasonable search and seizure;
that since the federal law violated by the interception and divulgence was not a constitutional
guaranty but merely a statute, the rule of the
Mapp case did not apply, particularly in light of
the fact that the United States Supreme Court
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had expressly reaffirmed Schwartz v. Texas, 344
U.S. 199 (1952) (holding that wiretap evidence
obtained by a state in violation of §605 is admissible in state criminal cases) in Pugach v.
Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961), affiriming per curiam
277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), only four months
before the Mapp decision; and failure in Mapp to
cite Pugach as being overruled indicated that the
Court intended that Mapp be limited to evidence
obtained unconstitutionally by unreasonable
search and seizure rather than extended to evidence
obtained in violation of federal statutes and rules
as well.
Withdrawal of Guilty Plea-State v. Corvelo,
369 P.2d 903 (Ariz. 1962). Five months after
defendant pleaded not guilty to an information
charging him with the crime of "receiving stolen
property, a felony," the state amended 'the
information, omitting the designation of the crime
as a felony. Defendant was convicted on his plea of
guilty to the amended information. On appeal,
defendant contended that since he was induced to
plead guilty because any conviction of a felony
would subject him to deportation as an undesirable
alien and he erroneously believed that the amended
information charged him with a lesser offense than
a felony, the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw the plea of guilty. The Supreme Court
of Arizona set aside the conviction and remanded
for further proceedings, holding that sinc defendant entered the guilty plea under a mistake or
misapprehension as to its legal effect, the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw the plea
amounted to an abuse of discretion.
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